Introduction
Understanding the relationships between natural and human systems has become an essential step for natural resource management and biodiversity conservation. Increasingly, the functional interdependencies of these systems have been recognized by scientists. Humans, especially local communities, are perceived as direct users of natural resources, and immediately affected by environmental degradation. Humans are the root of both causes and solutions for these problems (Bulkeley and Mol 2003) . Furthermore, there is an assumption that local communities may possess more substantive knowledge than other actors about the resources and areas where they live. Hence communities could be the best managers of resources or at the least they must be actively involved in resource management (Western and Wright 1994, Sponsel et al. 1996) . Community participation, together with other actors, is deemed to be crucial for any environmental governance program (Kapoor 2001; Layzer 2002; Bulkeley and Mol 2003) .
There is an extensive literature on the shift from an administrative state to a collaborative state (Koontz and Thomas 2006) and from hierarchical government to multilevel governance of environmental issues (Rhodes 1997; Dwyer 1998; Davis and Rhodes 2000; Pierre and Peters 2000; Considine 2001; Peters and Pierre 2001; Banner 2002; Newman et al. 2004) . This is especially so for protected areas where there are a range of actors and stakeholders across different levels and scales possessing various, but often conflicting, powers and interests (Brown et al. 2001) . Over the past decade, the human or social dimension, including organisations, institutions, human behaviour, social capital and social interactions between actors has been studied to further understand the nature of grassroots causes of environmental issues (Janssen and Jager 2001; Pretty and Ward 2001; Lansing 2003; Pretty and Smith 2004) . Studies have been undertaken of the participation and collaboration of civil society and other stakeholders, and their values and characteristics in environmental governance. Some solutions have been found for uncertainties and changes of complex human-natural systems (Lee 1993; Grumbine 1994; Dietz et al. 2003) . A number of barriers have been studied to participation and collaboration in governance of these systems, but are not sufficiently understood. This circumstance is also recognized in Vietnam.
Vietnam has a coastline of 3,260 km stretching over 13 degrees of latitude with a variety of biogeographic features. A large range of geographic characteristics has partially contributed to a high diversity in species composition and ecosystems for the marine and coastal areas. These encompass not only typical tropical ecosystems, such as coral reefs, seagrass beds, and mangroves, but also other coastal ecosystems with high bio-productivity, for example, tidal marshes, lagoons, river mouths, tidal mudflats, wetlands and up-welling currents (Hoi et al. 2000) . In addition, marine dependent industries have significantly contributed to the GDP of Vietnam. A rapid increase in population because of a high labour demand in coastal communities has also been recorded. This has created major challenges for the management and governance of marine resources and sustainable development. An initiative to establish a national Marine Protected Area (MPA) network was one significant action addressed in the Biodiversity Action Plans for achieving Vietnam's Agenda 21 commitments. In 1998, fifteen Marine Protected Areas were introduced to form a national MPA network (Hoi et al. 1998 ; Ministry of Fisheries 2006) and were officially approved by the Prime Minister in 2010.
2 Various factors, however, have been perceived as barriers to effective governance of individual MPAs, and the MPA network.
This article presents the barriers to multilevel govenance processes of Marine Protected Areas established in Vietnam. Con Dao, Halong and Nha Trang MPAs, part of the national MPA network, were selected as case studies to examine these issues. We begin with an overview of multilevel environmental governance as a contemporary approach to natural resource management and biodiversity conservation. We use institutional, organizational and behavioural concepts to describe and interpret complex social interactions between actors, and perceived barriers to these interactions. A multilevel organizational structure and socio-economic, institutional and other contextual conditions related to MPA governance in
Understanding a multilevel organizational structure related to Marine Protected Area governance in Vietnam
In Vietnam, there are three constitutional components of government -legislative, executive and judicial. The National Assembly is a legislative body that has the highest powers and approves the Constitution, Resolutions and all laws. The Judiciary consists of agencies or bodies responsible for enforcing the laws of Vietnam to solve conflicts or disputes. The executive component consists of administrative agencies designated as a hierarchical system (see Figures 1 and 2 ). These agencies issue legal documents that guide implementation of the constitution, resolutions and laws approved by the National Assembly. At national level, while the government has power to promulgate decrees and decisions coming into effect over the country, sectoral ministries have power to issue circulars and decisions that are applied for its particular sector. At the local level, agencies, such as provincial, district or commune Peoples' committees, approve and sign legal documents, which are used for day-to-day management and governance activities.
The organizational structure of the Vietnam Government can be divided into two nested sub-structures based on geopolitical allocation: (i) the National administrative sub-structure: includes government offices, Ministries and other national-level offices responsible for administratively steering implementation of all aspects of socio-economic development, and for the execution of legal documents, over the whole country.
(ii) The local administrative sub-structure: consists of Peoples' Committees at province, district and commune levels. Sectoral agencies at these levels are responsible for administrative processes to ensure that socio-economic activities are developed as planned at the equivalent geopolitical scale. In addition, governmental agencies at each level can be designated either as an administrative management agency, government enterprise or government business enterprise (Figure 1 ). They have different mandates and legal rights and are constrained by specific regulations. While administrative management agencies consult Peoples' committees in the execution of formal regulations, other functional departments and enterprises assist the Peoples' Committees in implementing and delivering socio-economic activities and services. Taking another view, Figure 2 illustrates the vertical hierarchical system among responsible jurisdictions. The Government and Peoples' Committees, from provincial to commune level, are administrative agencies and responsible for general jurisdictions of certain locations. Other agencies, such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, and similar Departments at provincial, district and commune levels, are sectoral agencies and responsible for specific technical jurisdictions of that particular sector over the assigned scale.
As indicated in Figure 2 , a sectoral Provincial agency that integrates administrative management mandates and technical functions, is responsible to two entities: (i) the Provincial Peoples' Committee for general administrative management; and (ii) the sectoral Ministry for technical supervision. For example, a In brief, when a Marine Protected Area is established, its management authority can be located at national, provincial or lower levels and designated as an administrative management agency, government enterprise or government business enterprise. A MPA authority is typically established under one agency, such as a Peoples' Committee for general administrative management, and another sectoral agency for technical guidance and regulations.
The research sites
This study was undertaken to understand what factors can actually impede the participation and collaborative interactions between the actors to make decisions under this form of multilevel governance. (Figure 3 ). Each of these sites are marked by different colours and shapes in Figure 3 . Some distinctive geographic, biological and cultural characteristics, and the institutional arrangements in these areas are described more details in the next sections and summarized in 6 Furthermore, this area is a tourism site for domestic and foreign visitors. Tourism has taken off in and close to Nha Trang Bay MPA, especially resorts and marine-related recreational activities. These developments have negatively affected local marine resources and habitats. For example, tourism development on Hon Tre Island, located inside the MPA, was identified as a likely reason for the major loss of a significant seagrass bed (at Dam Gia site). Infrastructure developments on islands and along the beach and port dredging have both been marked as major contributors to silt buildup on coral reefs around near-shore islands (Hon Mieu, Hon Tam).
7 In addition, lobster-cage aquaculture development within the MPA has decreased water quality and marine resources. Specifically, almost all lobster juveniles supplied for lobster-cage aquaculture have been collected from the wild. Trash fish, including molluscs, small fish, crabs and other by-catch marine organisms have been used as food for cultured lobsters. The uneaten feed and aquaculture detritus and effluent have been discharged directly to the surrounding waters.
8 Oil spills are also potential threats to water quality because there is a large range of boats and ships operating at this area. These include tourism boats and cruise ships, fishing boats, maritime transport and port activities. These socio-economic activities operated by local people and outsiders have been identified as challenges for the management of the MPA.
Con Dao National Park
Con International in Indochina and Ministry of Agricuture and Rural Development, 2004) . There is also a surrounding marine buffer zone area of 20,500 ha. 9 The Con Dao National Park Management Authority was formed in 1993 to conserve and recover ecosystems and their values (coral was collected by the former penal colony to be made into lime), and rare fauna and flora species of the islands and marine areas within the Park. This Authority is under the jurisdiction of Ba Ria -Vung Tau Provincial Peoples' Committee and professionally instructed by Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.
This National Park encompasses 16 islands and islets. There are approximately 5,610 inhabitants -1,348 households residing on the largest island, Côn Sơn. Of these, 4,162 people are registered as permanent residents, the remainders are temporary. A high yearly population growth rate of 6.36% has been recorded for this area compared with the average rate of 1.2% for Vietnam.
10 There is some tourist activity. The major contribution to this population increase is migration from other areas (5.27%), with only 1.09% natural population increase.
11 The rapid growth in population has been perceived as an underlying cause of other socio-economic problems for local people on this island.
12

Research methods
A deductive approach was used to carry out this investigation using qualitative data collection instruments, including focus-group discussions, semi-structured and open-ended interviews. A total of 172 participants from governmental agencies, local authorities, communities and MPA authorities were involved (including 9 group discussions totalling 90 participants). A 'backsolving' approach (Edwards and Steins 1999) was applied to collect in-depth information on the research issues. Questions were posed relating to the outcomes and consequences of participation in each MPA, and with multilevel governance institutions. The causes and effects of these outcomes and their consequences were provided by the participants, based on their knowledge and experience. Finally, perceived barriers to effective multilevel governance were identified.
The data collected were organized on the basis of themes emerging from documentation, institutional analysis (Pido et al. 1997; Bellamy et al. 1999; Imperial 1999a; Imperial 1999b; Pretty and Ward 2001; Rudd et al. 2003) and effective governance performance (Graham et al. 2003; Folke et al. 2005) . These themes were classified into categories corresponding to the research objectives. The data organizing system is hierarchical and contains data categories, themes and information segments. It was used as guidance for analyzing data. The textual transcriptions from the interviews were scanned, identified, refined and placed into the system gradually, following Tesch (1990) . The software package NVivo (version 8) was used to facilitate the analysis. This study also used organizational theories, social learning and behavioural approaches as fundamental theories and concepts for data interpretation. A triangulation process was undertaken through various data sources, personal observations, communications and plenary discussion at workshops to reduce personal and method biases (Decrop 1999) .
Letters were used as participants' identifiers. The participants' identifiers were coded over the levels from national to local community levels. In particular, "N" was for participants from the national level. Similarly, "P", "C" and "L" were for provincial, communal and local community levels, respectively. "GD" was for focus group discussions.
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Covered area
15,400 ha (6,400 ha land and 9,000 ha marine area).
16,000 ha (3,800 ha land and 12,200 ha marine area).
155,300 ha (including 1,969 islands and islets). 
Designated as
Results and discussion
We identified six dominant barriers to the participation and collaboration of state and non-state actors in MPA governance in Vietnam. Awareness of local communities, economics and social capital are barriers to the participation of local communities in multilevel governance processes of the MPAs. Meanwhile, differences in organizational types, power conflicts, and a lack of incentive sharing mechanisms among participating agencies, are underlying obstacles to the collaboration between stateactors across sectoral departments for MPA governance. These are elaborated as follows.
Barrier 1: Awareness of local communities
The participation of local communities in MPA governance depends on whether or not they understand the objectives and outcomes of these governance activities, especially as these activities positively or negatively affect their living conditions. "Someone who understands the activities well actively participates in the activities. Some others [who] have not yet understood ignore the activities" (L21). This point was also confirmed by participants in a group discussion (GD2 According to Burke (2001) , an increase in awareness and perception of local communities about environmental problems, ecosystem resilience and the potential impacts of environmental degradation on resource users and the society is vital for implementing environmental education and consensus-building programmes. It has been perceived by actors including resource scientists and managers that the increase in awareness and perception will promote better understanding and appreciation of the environment, and to have environmentally-responsible behaviour (Gunderson et al. 2000) . At the study sites, local communities have increased their perception and awareness about environmental issues and resource degradation after becoming involved in environmental education and activities organized by the MPA authorities. They have changed their behaviour to support environmental protection and resource conservation. However, they have not totally committed to, nor has there been an agreed consensus towards, environmentally-responsible behaviour because of their own economic constraints and existing subsistence needs.
Barrier 2: Economics
A number of participants in Nha Trang and Con Dao responded in interviews that they felt the establishment of the MPAs has negatively affected their livelihoods, especially the families who usually fished in the area now used as a core zone of the MPAs (areas now excluded from fishing). Fishers who have bigger boats and diverse fishing gear, can go further and have been less affected (L28, L14): It appears that economic constraints have directly influenced the participation of local communities in conservation and governance activities at the study sites, as found in another study (Brown 2011) . Economic difficulties may threaten the efforts of the MPA authorities because local people may fish illegally at forbidden areas when they have no income from their fishing activities. Gibson and Marks (1995) argue that many wildlife conservation programmes in Africa have failed because they cannot supply sufficient economic incentives to local people who lived on hunting activities and depended on wildlife in protected areas for subsistence. This is especially so when the benefits are not derived from conservation outcomes and the sharing mechanism of these benefits is inequitable.
Similar to policy initiatives found in integrated conservation and development programs, the MPA authorities have conducted various alternative livelihood supportive programs for local communities, for example aquaculture of environmentally-friendly species, handicrafts, and small credit schemes. The local communities have appreciated the benefits from development support, for example improvement of the social welfare system for the benefit of the whole community. However, most of these economic benefits have been supplied by external sources, including international and government agencies, instead of stemming from local conservation efforts. Local people still have not yet clearly recognized direct economic benefits derived from conservation outputs and outcomes for individuals or their households, such as increases in fish yields or incomes from environmental tourism services. In other words, the MPA authorities have not yet demonstrated a positive correlation between conservation programs of the MPAs and socioeconomic improvements (Brown 2011) . In this case, the local communities may become aid recipients from development support (Newmark and Hough 2000) , rather than collaborators or partners in long-term governance of the MPAs.
McNeely and Scherr (2003) confirm that increasing incomes returned from conservation outcomes has transformed local communities' attitudes about biodiversity and made them more appreciative and better engaged in biodiversity conservation. Similarly, Pretty and Smith (2004) argue that some protected areas have been successful thanks to social programmes conducted within these areas from which local people can receive wild-resource-related incomes. They have then in turn been more involved for the long-term management of resources through increased collective incentives. The MPA authorities at the study sites should consider linking conservation efforts of local communities with development benefits. It means that local communities can receive benefits which originate from their conservation efforts to ensure their long-term commitment for active participation in this process.
Economic benefits can be a driving force for immediate, but not consistent, participation by local people in MPA governance. In the long term, social capital is needed to foster environmentallyresponsible behaviour in local communities. Regulations and economic incentives may help change local communities' attitudes towards environmentally-friendly behaviour and practices, but may not change their personal attitudes (Gardner and Stern 1996, cited by Pretty 2003) . Consequently, people can return to their old ways when incentives terminate or regulations lose their effects. A long-term governance mechanism should rely on a combination of economic incentives, regulations and social capital.
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Barrier 3: Social capital Respondents identified several areas related to social capital that can affect the engagement of local communities in MPA governance. These include (i) the origin of local people, (ii) blood relationships and (iii) traditional cultural norms and taboos. We discuss these three issues in turn.
(i)
Local people with diverse origins Participants stated that local people residing in fishing villages come from different areas. Most people migrated to these villages from elsewhere in Vietnam to seek better livelihoods (L14, L21, L1), to receive support from the government (L8, L9) or to avoid conflict (L24). The different origins of resident groups have influenced social connectedness of the fisheries communities: These traditional cultural norms or taboos have helped connect the local communities and reduce fishing pressure on some marine species, including whale, dolphin, and turtle. However, traditional customs have become blurred over time because of their perceived irrelevance to the modernized lifestyles of the younger generation (L25, L21, L8, and L20). The gradual disappearance of the traditional culture and norms has also created constraints on administrative management of communities, recognized by village heads (L21, L20).
We argue that the social capital of local communities, their bonds of trust and reciprocal support, has been diminished because of the specific features and historical changes experienced by these communities. Connectedness between individuals exists, but only between those who are blood relations, or who come from the same fishing-gear communities, or who have the same origins -namely, a bonding linkage (Grafton 2005; Pretty and Ward 2001; Pretty 2003) . The links between other community members is weak, as is the social linkage (or bridging linkage after Pretty and Ward 2001) amongst local communities and other stakeholders, particularly with government actors. A strong bonding linkage coupled with a weak social linkage has led to high transaction costs for governance processes because of low mutual trust among local people, poor information and knowledge-exchange between local communities, government actors and other stakeholders (Grafton 2005) . Poor social capital weakens social linkages, which in turn affects the achievement of general consensus at the local community level, and reduces the effectiveness of governance.
In addition to the three barriers identified above, multilevel governance of the MPAs is impeded by other barriers to the collaboration between state actors and their agencies. These are, (i) differences in organizational types, (ii) power conflicts, and (iii) a lack of incentive sharing mechanisms among participating agencies.
Barrier 4: Differences in organizational types among agencies
According to administrative management regulations of Vietnam, a government agency can be designated as one of three types -an administrative management agency, a government enterprise or a government business enterprise. Each of these comes with specific mandates and legal rights, and is constrained by legal documentation. While the MPA authorities studied are designated as government business enterprises, other sectoral agencies at provincial and district levels are formed as 'administrative management agencies'. Some difficulties have emerged because of this difference. 
Some MPA authorities (e.g. Nha Trang Bay and Culaocham MPA) have developed an interagency collaborative regulation submitted to provincial Peoples' committee (PPC) -an in-line
Moreover, …there is no legislative guideline related to [collaborative governance of] MPAs, so it is hard for responsible agencies to consult the PPC to approve the regulation. (P9)
The MPA authority just collaborates with other agencies by inviting them based on activities or issues. (P9, P34, P35, P22, P5) As a government business enterprise, the MPA authority does not have a strong legal mandate to complete tasks related to administrative management of the MPA (P34). Other provincial sectoral departments can ignore the activities of the MPA authority because they do not want to support this type of government business enterprise (P30). They are reluctant to get involved in the activities conducted by the MPA authority (P35) and just assign low-level staff or officers, who do not have much influence on the decision making process for collaborative activities. Hence they cannot effectively support collaborative activities after attending management workshops or meetings (P34, P35). Furthermore, the MPA authority does not benefit from information-sharing about situations or activities operated within and nearby the MPA by the provincial Peoples' committee and other related agencies (P34), because it is excluded from inter-agency meetings (P21). In this case, the influence of the authority on general governance processes at the Province level, even for activities operated within the MPA, is weak. The lack of information sharing and communication is one of the most important factors that increase transaction costs and slow down effective governance processes (Challen 2000) . In contrast, if the MPA authority was designated as an administrative management agency, the finance and power for management and governance of the site would have to be shared among the authority and other agencies. This would result in competition for financial allocation and conflicts in management powers between the agencies [P35].
Barrier 5: Conflicts for power among agencies
The power of an agency in decision making is proscribed by degrees of responsibility and the mandates approved by responsible agencies. There are a number of stakeholders interested in resources use, and agencies involved in governing activities within the MPAs. Some difficulties have been 
An asymmetric distribution of power to make decisions for resource control or uses has impeded interagency collaboration. A MPA authority like Nha Trang Bay Authority is a newly-established organisation with an insufficient institutional framework and limited resources. The voluntary sharing of power from existing agencies to a new one like the MPA authority is difficult. However, the 'level' of the MPA authority in the organisational structure can help enhance its power in the governance process. In the case of Con Dao National Park (NP), the local Authority cannot intervene in decision making for development activities operated within the NP boundary because the Con Dao NP was established by a decision of the Prime Minister and is regulated by a higher level and by specific legal documents for this sector (C1, P1). Similarly, a barrier to interagency collaboration arising from power conflicts can be overcome if there is oversight or intervention from a higher level. An approval from a provincial Peoples' committee (PPC) can significantly aid interagency collaborative governance because all the agencies and partners must abide by decisions of the PPC (P21, P29, P34, P35, P22). This barrier can be mitigated further if an interagency collaborative mechanism is institutionalized and prescribed through formal legal documents.
Because of these power conflicts present in the scheme of governance outlined in Figure 2 , some respondents seriously challenged the level and organizational type of the MPA authority in the governance structure of the provinces. While some participants claimed that an MPA authority cannot be an administrative management agency (P28, P30), another complained that Provincial agencies do not want the MPA authority to hold too many powers (P34). It seems the agency's organizational type and the power conflict are related. Both influence the exercise of stakeholders' power to make decisions that relate to resources use and management within the MPA.
The initial design of a MPA authority, either an administrative management or government business enterprise, can affect its future ability to resolve power conflicts and financial issues. The more powerful agencies (the administrative management agencies) can exclude a new participant (a MPA authority) from the interagency governance network. Currently, most MPA authorities in Vietnam -as goverment business enterprises -may have a voice in discussing issues, but do not have authority and resources for making and implementing decisions. With regard to the power of an organisation in an interorganizational network, as defined by Hardy and Phillips (1998) , it can be said that MPA authorities in Vietnam have a discursive legitimacy, but no formal authority and lack critical resources. According to Jentoft (2007) , the power of an organisation can be exercised in different ways, positive or negative, depending on the interests of those holding power. Powerful stakeholders or organisations may use their power to maximize their advantages by redefining issues or influencing the participation of other stakeholders or organisations in the network (Hardy and Phillips 1998) . They may even drive negotiations or regimes that lie within the scope of multilateral organisations to meet their interests (Lemos and Agrawal 2006) . It seems that the MPA authorities, with a particular designated organizational type and power within the particular institutional conditions of Vietnam, have weak or insignificant legal influence in effective inter-agency MPA governance. Another barrier is the lack of economic incentive sharing mechanisms for participating organisations.
Barrier 6: Lack of incentive sharing mechanisms among participating agencies
Participants mentioned, directly or indirectly, the realistic status of incentive-sharing between participating agencies for collaborative activities. The incentives here can be tangible benefits (e.g. economic allowances), or intangible ones (e.g. knowledge gained from training or education courses). Most participants expressed that incentive sharing is a necessity for participating bodies to be actively involved in collaborative activities. The lack of incentive sharing mechanisms is a substantial obstacle to the collaborative process. The lack of economic incentives (e.g. payments for patrolling the MPAs) has been one of the most important impediments for promoting collaboration among responsible agencies. The MPA authorities cannot collaborate with other agencies for the collaborative process without incentives (P5, P34, P35, and P22). The agencies do not have the motivation to become involved in MPA activities when the MPA authorities send requests to them asking for collaboration. They may participate reluctantly for the first few times and then ignore invitation letters from the authorities afterwards (P34).
Economic incentives are crucial attributes of effective environmental institutions. These shape behaviour of an individual and group (Hanna 1998) and lead to success and effectiveness of institutional implementation (Swallow and Bromley 1995; Hanna 1998; Hilborn et al. 2005) . Understanding economic incentives is important, but establishing incentive and reward mechanisms that direct resource users and managers to desired behaviour or to expected reactions is a challenge (Hanna 1998) . The collaboration between state actors and different agencies has been hindered because no formal incentive sharing or benefit payment mechanism for partners is available in Vietnam for MPA governance. Irrespective of the type or number of property right regimes applied, natural resource management can be successful depending on the cultural, economic and biophysical context (Ostrom 1990 ) and also on whether environmental institutions can satisfy all basic functions including creating economic incentives (Hanna 1998) . In other words, MPA governance at the study sites is unlikely to succeed if economic incentive sharing is not institutionalized through formal rules.
Although the six barriers identified above have obstructed the effective multi-level governance of the MPAs studied, their impacts may vary across sites depending on their political ecology -the different socio-economic, institutional contexts and the establisment history of particular MPAs. For example, the barrier related to the difference in agency's organizational type has been addressed more directly at Nha Trang MPA, but not in other protected areas, such as Con Dao and Halong Bay. The question arises as to why organisational type resulted in different effects at different marine conservation sites? The answers lie with the different external contexts.
First, Con Dao and Halong areas were established by the Prime Minister or adopted as areas of national significance, whereas Nha Trang and other later typical MPAs were established by the Provincial level. The influence of provincial Peoples' committee and other Provincial sectoral agencies seems to be of prime importance for collaborative governance of MPAs at this level. The MPAs with national significance (e.g. Con Dao, Halong Bay) can have interventions, support and influence from the national level, in addition to the Provincial level (see Barrier 5 above). Therefore, these MPA authorities can collaborate with other agencies effectively, even though they have different organizational types, because of the influence from the national level.
Second, Con Dao National Park follows an institutional framework that started with special-use forests on small islands, while Halong Bay is a World Heritage site that follows an institutional framework dictated by international conventions. In addition, most MPAs in Vietnam were established prior to the establishment of relevant sets of rules. Indeed, there are no legal documents available to prescribe whether the MPA authority should be designated as an administrative management agency or another type, nor to guide other agencies in working with the authority. This means that institutional frameworks for Con Dao and Halong Bay sites are much more 'mature' than the newly-shaped institutions for typical MPAs as Nha Trang Bay. Therefore, government agencies better understand and accept how to work with or to collaborate with Con Dao and Halong Bay Authorities, than with typical MPA authorities such as Nha Trang MPA. Third, these sites have different socio-economic conditions that partly influence the effects of the barriers to governance processes of these sites. Specifically, there are more diverse stakeholders' and related agencies' interests at Nha Trang MPA site, as opposed to Con Dao-which is an isolated island with emerging tourism activities. Hence, conflicts over resource use, and the power exercised at Nha Trang MPA, is much more complicated than that at Con Dao. Halong Bay has very complex conflicts because of its various stakeholders and related agencies that are similar to Nha Trang MPA. The differences in the agency's organizational type at Halong Bay do not significantly impede governance processes because this site was adopted as internationally significant and there is a more 'mature' institutional framework operating.
In other words, the same barriers can have different effects for different protected areas because of their different contextual conditions. These include (i) administrative level, (ii) the maturity and nature of institutional arrangements applied, and (iii) socio-economic conditions of the local population. Hence, contextual forces play a significant role in the collaborative governance processes of MPAs in Vietnam. These forces influence each other, and then affect governance. A particular barrier can have more impact on one site than others. Furthermore, the 'maturity' of institutions can advance governance processes. The actors can use available institutions to make the right decisions to overcome competition or other obstacles.
Lastly, what of the interactions between state and non-state actors in the multilevel governance of the MPAs? This study also detected that mutual trust, communication and reciprocity can help nurture and foster the collaboration and interactions between state and non-state actors in MPA multilevel governance. These also interact each other in governance processes. Interactive communication is a general process of deliberation wherein state and non-state actors can share considered issues and enhance mutual understanding to arrive at a high level of consensus on important decisions (Schusler et al. 2003; Pahl-Wostl and Hare 2004) . Communication helps build mutual trust between participants through dialogue without domination and distortion (Yankelovich 1991; Hahn et al. 2006) . Mutual trust can help participants 'leave personal agendas at home' to work together to achieve common-shared goals (Pretty and Smith 2004) . When people trust each other, they can save time and money by confidently investing resources into collective activities, instead of monitoring each other. When mutual trust exists, resource managers, regulators and resource users can share their own knowledge and information, whether traditional or scientific (Grafton, 2005) , to enhance the understanding of each other (Berman et al. 1999) . Similarly, reciprocity also increases trust and contributes to the development of the long-term commitment and engagement of participants to achieve common environmental goals (Pretty, 2003; Pretty and Smith 2004) . In brief, as part of social capital, mutual trust, communication and reciprocity interact with each other (Pretty and Ward 2001) . These can lower the costs and enhance the relationship between the participants in collaborative governance processes.
Conclusions
This article has investigated perceived barriers to social interactions between state and non-state actors that influence multilevel governance of MPAs in Vietnam. A number of critical barriers related to socio-economic conditions, including (i) awareness of local communities, (ii) economics and (iii) social capital, were found to have significantly impeded the participation of local communities in MPA governance. Major barriers to the collaboration between state actors across sectoral departments for MPA governance processes include (iv) a distinction in an agency's organizational type, (v) power conflicts and (vi) a lack of incentive sharing mechanisms. Any possible intervention to resolve these barriers, whether individually or simultaneously, can improve effective governance and management of the MPAs.
The study has also revealed that mutual trust, communication and reciprocity can advance social interactions between the actors in multilevel governance of the MPAs. This should be considered at the outset of MPA establishment, in order to develop a solid foundation for later multilevel governance processes for MPAs. These findings are in accordance with previous research about the roles of social capital in natural resource management and conservation (Baland and Platteau 1996; Pretty and Ward 2001; Brown 2002; Olsson et al. 2004; Grafton, 2005) .
We conclude that formal institutions, and the existing design of MPA authorities, have influenced collaborative governance processes within the socio-political context of Vietnam. These have not only
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